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Entering the DRM-Free Zone:
An Intellectual Property and Antitrust
Analysis of the Online Music Industry
Monika Roth*
Recently, EMI, the world’s third largest recording company,
and part of the “Big Four” record labels that own and control
almost all of the music available to American consumers, broke
with industry practice and announced that it would no longer sell
songs with built-in copy restrictions. This move followed a public
request by Steve Jobs, Chief Executive Officer of Apple, for
recording companies to allow the sale of music online without
antipiracy software, proclaiming that it would be the “best
alternative for consumers.”1 Up until this point, all the major
music companies have been selling all digital songs with copy
restrictions. Starting in May 2007, EMI’s music began to be sold
through Apple’s iTunes and other online music stores at the cost of
thirty cents extra per song ($1.29 per song rather than 99 cents).
Eric Nicoli, EMI’s chief executive was quoted saying: “It was
clear what we had to do because we hold the customer at the center

A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2586. Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete
Journal archive.
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Steven Jobs, Thoughts on Music, http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic/
(Feb. 6, 2007); see also John Markoff, Apple Chief Urges Shift on Piracy, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 2007, at C1 [hereinafter Apple Chief].
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of our focus” and “we have to trust our customers.”2 Was it the
potential concern for its customers, and Apple’s support, that
caused EMI to part with its long-standing business practice?
Possibly. However, an analysis of the history and current state of
the online music industry presents some alternate factors that likely
influenced the moves made by both Apple and EMI.
Part I of this Note begins by defining copyright infringement
and explaining its rise in the music industry with the advent of the
internet. Next, Part II outlines the legal complexities regarding
copyright infringement in the music industry, and Part III
highlights the music industry’s non-legal response to the copyright
infringement problem. Part IV introduces the innovative solutions
initiated by Apple to combat industry problems and Part V
explains the antitrust issues raised by these innovative solutions.
Part VI broadens the scope of the problems faced by Apple to the
international playing field. Part VII concludes that the failure of
the music industry’s past solutions to copyright infringement may
be the true reason that the record labels are looking at selling
online music without copy restrictions.
I. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND P2P NETWORKS
The United States Copyright Act of 1976 provides that
copyright holders have the exclusive right to authorize the
reproduction and distribution of duplicates of copyrighted work.3
Thus, copyright infringement occurs when copyrighted material is
used without authorization. The internet, while producing many
benefits for our society, also facilitated a new realm of copyright
infringement. With the rise of peer-to-peer (P2P) software, it is
relatively easy for consumers to obtain music online by sharing
files through an autonomous network of computers without any

2

Thomas Crampton, EMI Dropping Copy Limits on Online Music, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
2, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/03/technology/03music.web.html [hereinafter
EMI Dropping Copy Limits].
3
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–22 (2006); see also J. Heath Loftin, Secondary Liability for
Copyright Infringement: Why the Courts May Be Nearing the End of the Line for
Imposing Further Liability on Peer-to-Peer Software Distributors, 37 CUMB. L. REV.
111, 114 (2006).
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central server.4 The software connects the hard drives of users
with those of other users and thus creates a network.5 Once a
network exists, an index of files can be freely exchanged among its
users.6
A prime reason for copyright infringement is the consumer’s
desire to have a specific song without having to purchase the entire
album.7 The desire for unbundled music is difficult to satisfy when
music is distributed through compact disks (CDs).
The
proliferation of download services has made it simpler to respond
to consumer demand through “disaggregation.”8
II. THE LEGAL DIMENSION OF UNAUTHORIZED ONLINE MUSIC
DISTRIBUTION AND QUESTIONS REGARDING LIABILITY
Copyright holders tried to combat copyright infringement by
taking the problem to court. Since it would be too arduous to sue
all the individual copyright infringers, copyright holders instead
opted to sue the designers and providers of the P2P networks for
contributory infringement. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc. is the seminal United States Supreme Court case
construing contributory copyright liability.9 In Sony, owners of
copyrights on television programs brought a copyright
infringement action against manufacturers of home videotape
recorders (VCRs). The copyright owners alleged that some
individuals had used Betamax VCRs to record copyrighted works
played on commercially sponsored television, claiming that the
manufacturers were liable for the copyright infringement
committed by the consumers.10
4

See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004),
vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005) [hereinafter Grokster]; see also Peer-to-peer, Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer-to-peer (last visited Oct. 18, 2007); File sharing,
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_sharing (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
5
Peer-to-peer, supra note 4; File sharing, supra note 4.
6
Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1158; Peer-to-peer, supra note 4; File sharing, supra note 4.
7
Eddy Hsu, Antitrust Regulation Applied to Problems in Cyberspace: iTunes and
iPod, 9 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 117, 120 (2005).
8
Id.
9
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
10
Id. at 420.
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Relying on an analogy to patent law,11 the Supreme Court held
that a party could not be held liable as a contributory infringer as a
result of manufacturing and selling copying equipment like a VCR.
If the copying device is capable of “‘substantial’ or ‘commercially
significant noninfringing uses,’ . . . the manufacturer would not be
liable for contributory infringement.”12 The Supreme Court held
that the VCR was “capable of substantial noninfringing uses” since
“the primary use of the machine for most owners was timeshifting”13 and a “significant quantity of that time-shifting was
expressly authorized by various broadcasters.”14 Time-shifting is
the ability of a consumer to record a program and watch it at a later
time.
Meanwhile, the emerging field of P2P software raised new
questions within copyright law. Historically, “anyone wishing to
publicly distribute an artistic work . . . would have to negotiate
with the rights-holding gatekeeper . . . for permission to do so.”15
However, P2P software programs eliminate the need for a
gatekeeper. The realization of this fact led many copyright holders
to come together and bring suits against designers of these
programs, starting with Napster.16 They deemed it less costly and
more effective to go after the single secondary infringer rather than
the mass of direct infringers.17 Unfortunately, the results of these
lawsuits were “less than conclusive.”18 The uses of P2P file
sharing systems are clearly infringing when users downloaded
copyrighted works, but “it was not at all clear that Sony’s
contributory liability test should support the imposition of liability
on the designers of these programs—especially as many P2P
programs arguably satisfied Sony’s ‘capable of substantial
noninfringing use’ threshold.”19
11

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), (c) (2006).
John M. Moye, How Sony Survived: Peer-to-Peer Software, Grokster, and
Contributory Copyright Liability in the Twenty-First Century, 84 N.C. L. REV. 646, 657
(2006) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 442).
13
Sony, 464 U.S. at 423.
14
Id. at 444.
15
Moye, supra note 12, at 661.
16
Id.; see also infra notes 20–31 and accompanying text.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 662.
19
Id. (italics added).
12
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Contributory liability for a P2P software designer was first
truly addressed in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.20 Through
various tools like Napster’s MusicShare software, an internet site
that offered the software for free, network servers and server-side
software, Napster made it possible for users to download exact
copies of music files stored on other users’ computers.21 In order
to determine whether Napster was liable for contributory copyright
infringement, the court set out two elements: (1) knowledge of the
infringing activity and (2) material contribution to the infringing
activity.22
Napster satisfied both elements.
Napster had
“knowledge, both actual and constructive, of direct infringement”23
and materially contributed by providing “the site and facilities” for
direct infringement.24 The court clarified the Sony holding by
stating that Sony does not impute the requisite level of knowledge
where there is capability of substantial noninfringing uses.25
However, since Napster had “actual, specific knowledge,”
contributory liability was applicable, despite the existence of a
capability for substantial noninfringing uses.26
The Ninth Circuit approach to the Sony doctrine conflicted
with an alternate interpretation that developed in the Seventh
Circuit. In the case In re Aimster Copyright Litigation,27 involving
another P2P software provider, the court held that when there is a
product involving both infringing and noninfringing uses, an
estimate of the “respective magnitudes of the uses is necessary for
a finding of contributory infringement.”28 “Construing Sony this
way, the court held that a defendant would not be able to escape
liability for contributory infringement merely by showing that its
product could be used in noninfringing ways.”29 Being capable of
20

239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1011.
22
Id. at 1019 (quoting Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443
F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
23
Id. at 1020.
24
Id. at 1022 (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir.
1996)).
25
Id. at 1020.
26
Id.
27
334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1107 (2004).
28
Id. at 649; see also Moye, supra note 12, at 667.
29
Moye, supra note 12, at 667.
21
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noninfringing uses is not enough to escape liability; a defendant
must show that the product was used for substantial noninfringing
uses.30
The split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits over the
interpretation of the Sony doctrine caused a change in strategy in
the recording industry. Injunctions against P2P systems were
abandoned in favor of pursuing individual lawsuits against direct
infringers.31 However, this approach, besides being expensive and
time-consuming, backfired. Rather than stirring public sympathy
for the industry, it had the reverse effect of demonizing the parties
bringing the suits, such as the Recording Industry Association of
America and the copyright holders they represented.32
The Supreme Court finally tackled the P2P debate in the wake
of the Sony doctrine in MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.33 A
group of movie studios and other copyright holders brought a
copyright infringement suit against distributors of a P2P file
sharing computer networking software.34 The distributors were
aware that their software was used to download copyrighted files,
but the decentralized networks did not reveal which files were
copied and when they were copied.35 Evidence suggested that the
the distributors intentionally structured their networks to
circumvent the centralized control that had led to Napster’s
demise.36 There was also evidence that the distributors “took
active steps to encourage infringement” and promoted and
marketed themselves as Napster alternatives.37 Furthermore, the
distributors took no steps to filter copyrighted material or
otherwise prevent the sharing of copyrighted files.38 The incentive
to refrain from regulating the downloading of files was financial;
the distributors made money by selling advertising space, and

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Id. at 667–68; Aimster, 334 F.3d at 651–53, 648.
Moye, supra note 12, at 671–72.
See id.
545 U.S. 913 (2005).
Id. at 913.
Id.
Moye, supra note 12, at 664–65.
Id.
Id.
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revenues increased the more the software was used.39 All of these
factors showed that the “principal object” of the business models
of the distributors was to use their software to download
copyrighted works,40 and thus an unlawful objective was
“unmistakable.”41 The theoretical basis for this conclusion was
expressed by the Supreme Court in “the rule on inducement of
infringement.”42 According to the inducement rule, “one who
distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of
infringement by third parties.”43 Consequently, due to the factors
of intent “to bring about infringement and distribution of a device
suitable for infringing use”44 present in this case, the Supreme
Court held that contributory liability was applicable.
The inducement theory articulated in Grokster still leaves
many issues open. “For example, is such a theory intended to now
supplement the already-familiar Sony doctrine, simply by
incorporating into it considerations of intent and purpose?”45 Or,
“alternatively, should a lower court now completely forgo the
‘capable of substantial noninfringing uses’ analysis where the
evidentiary record is replete with references to ‘affirmative steps’
taken to infringe?”46 These questions will only be answered with
time as lower courts begin applying the opinion to new copyright
liability cases. However, “considering the amount of money at
stake (Grokster, for example agreed to ‘pay up $50 million in
damages’), it is extremely important that P2P networks have some
sense of their potential liability in a case where no inducement
exists, and what they could and should do to avoid such liability.
The Grokster opinion is not instructive on this point . . . .”47 Thus,
39

Id. at 913.
Id. at 926.
41
Id. at 940.
42
Id. at 936.
43
Id. at 936–37.
44
Id. at 940.
45
Moye, supra note 12, at 679.
46
Id.
47
Julie Zankel, A Little Help With Sharing: A Mandatory Licensing Proposal to
Resolve the Unanswered Question Surrounding Peer-to-Peer Liability for Contributory
40
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it is understandable that the music industry has begun to explore
new technologies that protect copyrighted media, such as digital
rights management (DRM).
III. DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
With the rise of technology such as the cassette tape recorder,
photocopying equipment, the VCR, and most recently, P2P
networks, copying media has become a lot easier. It is now more
difficult to protect legal rights that had been previously enforced
through technological barriers.48 The introduction of digital media
has raised more concerns because, unlike the case with analog
media, digital media files can be copied infinitely without a
corresponding loss in quality. As a result, copyright holders have
turned to DRM as a method for protecting their copyrights. DRM
gives copyright holders the right to control the making of copies by
incorporating technology with use restrictions.49 Unfortunately, as
the case of Sony and others has proven, DRM has proven to
present many obstacles of its own.
Sony implemented a type of DRM when it began to sell CDs
with “built in copy protection designed to prevent illegal copying
between computers by forbidding a second computer from playing
the music without an additional purchase.”50 This solution may
sound clever but it came with numerous problems, including the
requirement that the first computer have an internet connection and
online registration by the owner. These technological obstacles
created a consumer backlash.
Sony used two different encryption systems, XCP and
MediaMax.51 An unencrypted CD allows the computer to copy
and store the music files on a computer.52 XCP and MediaMax,
Copyright Infringement in the Wake of Grokster, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 189, 191 (2006)
(footnotes omitted).
48
Randal C. Picker, Mistrust-Based Digital Rights Management, 5 J. TELECOMMS. &
HIGH TECH. L. 47, 49 (2006).
49
See Digital Rights Management, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Digital_rights_management (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
50
Hsu, supra note 7, at 119.
51
Picker, supra note 48, at 56.
52
Id. at 57–58.
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however, work differently.53 According to Ed Felton, a computer
scientist at Princeton University and Alex Halderman, his graduate
student, both types of DRM take advantage of the autorun feature
built into the Windows operating system that simplifies the
installation of new software.54 When autorun is enabled and a CD
with DRM is inserted, the software on the CD is triggered. This
software blocks “normal copying of the CD and can impose an
end-user license agreement that limits access by the computer to
the CD.”55 However, according to Felten and Halderman, a
knowledgeable computer user can avoid the DRM systems by
turning off autorun.56
Beyond the technical obstacles of the encryption systems, Sony
has also been presented with some legal issues. For example, the
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) filed a class action lawsuit
under the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act alleging: (i)
unfair, unlawful and fraudulent business practices in violation of
California Business and Professions Code Section 17200; (ii)
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and
(iii) false or misleading statements under California Business and
Professions Code 17500.57 Additionally, the State Attorney
Generals of Massachusetts and New York launched investigations
stemming from Sony sales and the Texas Attorney General
brought suit under the Texas Consumer Protection Against
Computer Spyware Act of 2005.58 Although the legal sufficiency
of some of these claims may be doubtful59 they nevertheless
indicate increased costs and trouble for Sony. Therefore, it is not
surprising that Sony was willing to settle the EFF lawsuit and
cease using encryption systems in the sale of CDs.60

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id. at 58.
Id.
Id.
Id at 60.
Id.
Id. at 60–61.
See id. at 61 (explaining the true purpose of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act).
See id. at 62.
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IV. THE APPLE APPROACH TO DRM
Apple’s solution to the problems facing the online music
industry and the music industry in general is iTunes.61 iTunes
allows consumers to download songs individually or as albums.62
The online store eliminates CD production costs, so songs and
albums are less expensive and available on demand.63
Probably the most significant aspect of iTunes is that it
addresses online music piracy and provides a new revenue option
by selling copyrighted music over the internet.64 A song purchased
through iTunes is downloaded to a destination computer and
comes encoded with the Advanced Audio Coding (“AAC”) codec,
copying technology based on MPEG-4 digital compression
technology.65 According to Apple, “AAC provides audio encoding
that compresses much more efficiently than earlier formats such as
MP3, yet delivers quality rivaling that of uncompressed CD
audio.”66
Before downloading the song, the consumer must agree to the
iTunes “Terms of Service,” which include “usage rules limiting the
number of times the music may be burned into CDs, the number of
devices which can simultaneously store the downloaded music and
an acknowledgement that the purchased music is encrypted to
prevent violation of the usage terms,”67 in addition to the right by
Apple to limit or stop access to downloaded music if iTunes is
discontinued.68 All of these restrictions that the user must agree to
allow Apple to limit the distribution of downloaded music.
While iTunes can be viewed as an effective way to deal with
copyright infringement, the real issues arise after the music is
purchased. Naturally, consumers might want to listen to their

61

See Hsu, supra note 7, at 120.
Id.
63
Id. at 120–21.
64
See id. at 121.
65
Id.
66
Id.
(citing
iTunes:
About
Advanced
Audio
Coding
(AAC),
http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=93012 (last visited Apr. 16, 2006)).
67
Id.
68
Id.
62
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downloaded music on other devices besides their computers.69 The
digital audio compression format, such as MP3 and AAC, allows
consumers to listen to mass quantities of music on very small
portable music players.70 However, in selecting a portable music
player or any other type of music-playing device, the consumer is
limited by the iTunes Terms of Service, which only allows for five
Apple-authorized devices at a time and the Apple iPod as the only
portable music player.71 Thus, when shopping around for a
portable music player, the consumer is limited to just one, the iPod,
the only player licensed by Apple to play music securely encoded
with Apple’s AAC codec.72 “Furthermore, if iTunes should cease
its service, the iPod will be the only way to continue to hear AAC
encoded music outside of the original computer used to download
the purchased music.”73 This close link that AAC encoded music
creates between iTunes and the iPod triggers antitrust concerns.74

V. ANTITRUST LAW AND TYING VIOLATIONS
The purpose of antitrust law is to promote competition.75
Technological innovation can challenge that purpose because it
enables competitors to produce a product that is technologically
incompatible with the rest of the marketplace.76 If several
competitors do the same thing, the benefits of the increase in
competition is counteracted with “a fractured market of noncompliant standards, which ultimately leads to consumer
frustration. Consumers buy incompatible devices, waste time by
trying to make devices compatible, and lose money in the

69

Id.
See id.
71
Id. at 121–22.
72
Id. at 122 (citing iTunes 4: About Third-party Music Players and AAC File Support,
http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=93032 (last visited Apr. 16, 2006)).
73
Id. (citing iTunes Music Store Terms of Service, http://www.apple.com/support/
itunes/legal/terms.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2006)).
74
Id.
75
See id.
76
Id.
70
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process.”77 Furthermore, if competitors want to agree on standards
they must proceed with caution to avoid a violation of the Sherman
Act, which can result in treble damages or criminal charges.78 The
Sherman Act was enacted as “a comprehensive charter of
economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the
unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best
allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic political and social institutions.”79 Section 1 of the
Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations or conspiracies
among competitors that unreasonably restrain competition.80
Section 2 punishes anyone who attempts or obtains an unlawful
monopoly.81
A. Tying Arrangements
The Supreme Court has defined a tying arrangement as “an
agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition
that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at
least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other
supplier.”82 Thus, tying arrangements suppress competition by
denying competitors free access to the market for the tied product,
“not because the party imposing the tying requirements has a better
product or a lower price but because of his power or leverage in
77

Id. at 123 (footnotes omitted).
See 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 309 (2007).
79
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
80
Id. at 4–5; see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (“Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”).
81
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by
imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of
the court.”); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
459 (1992).
82
N. Pac., 356 U.S. at 5–6.
78
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another market. At the same time buyers are forced to forego their
free choice between competing products.”83
Tying arrangements, agreements between the consumer and the
tying company for exclusive dealing, violate both § 1 and § 2 of
the Sherman Act. It is a § 1 violation because the agreement
excludes competition from the market.84 The monopolistic power
of the tying company is a § 2 violation because the tying company
unnecessarily restrains competition in the tied product.85 Although
both parties participate in the agreement, only the tying company is
punished for the violation because the consumer has no power to
resist and thus cannot be guilty of a tie.86
A tying arrangement is established upon the showing that: “(1)
the tying arrangement is between two distinct products or services,
(2) the defendant has sufficient economic power in the tying
market to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for
the tied product, and (3) a not insubstantial amount of interstate
commerce is affected.”87
In the past, a tying arrangement has been a “per se” violation.88
“Per se” violations are agreements or practices “which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use.”89 A “per se” violation
“avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged
economic investigation into the entire history of the industry
involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at
large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable . . . .”90
83

Id.
Hsu, supra note 7, at 123.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n No. One v. First Condo Dev. Co., 758 F.2d 203,
207 (7th Cir. 1985); see also N. Pac., 356 U.S. at 7–8 (noting a defendant’s economic
power and its purpose to “stifle competition” in determining a violation of the Sherman
Act).
88
See N. Pac., 356 U.S. at 5; Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947)
abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
89
N. Pac., 356 U.S. at 5.
90
Id.
84
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Recent cases such as United States v. Microsoft Corp. and
Jefferson Parish Hospital District. v. Hyde state that a tying
violation is just a presumed Sherman Act violation and may be
rebuttable under a “rule of reason” analysis.91 However, Microsoft
Corp. was settled before ever reaching the Supreme Court, so the
issue of whether a “rule of reason” analysis should be applied in
tying arrangements is still unresolved.92 Although not the majority
rule, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Jefferson Parish does
mention that “[t]he time has therefore come to abandon the ‘per se’
label and refocus the inquiry on the adverse economic effects, and
the potential economic benefits, that the tie may have.”93 Justice
O’Connor’s reasoning was that “[i]n practice, a tie has been illegal
only if the seller is shown to have ‘sufficient economic power with
respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition
in the market for the tied product . . . .’”94 Control or dominance
over the tying product is necessary for it to be “an effectual
weapon” to pressure buyers into taking the tied product; otherwise
any “restraint of trade” attributable to such tying arrangements
would be “insignificant.”95 Furthermore “[t]he [Supreme] Court
has never been willing to say of tying arrangements . . . that they
are always illegal, without proof of market power or
anticompetitive effect.”96
B. iPod and iTunes: A Tying Arrangement?
The tie between Apple’s iTunes and iPod may not be initially
obvious because a subscription to iTunes does not require an iPod

91

Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 44–55 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring), superseded by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2003), as recognized in Tex.
Instruments, Inc. v. Hyundai Elec. Indus., Co. Ltd., 49 F. Supp. 2d 893, 908 (E.D. Tex.
1999); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
92
See The Microsoft Settlement: A Look to the Future: Statement Before S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Charles A. James, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/
9681.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
93
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 35 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
94
Id. at 34 (quoting N. Pac., 356 U.S. at 6).
95
N. Pac., 356 U.S. at 6.
96
Id.
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purchase.97 Nevertheless, a tying analysis is not foreclosed for this
reason. Courts have found tying arrangement claims even when
they arise subsequent to the purchase of a service or product by a
consumer.98 For example, in Microsoft, the court found a tying
claim existed between the Internet Explorer browser and the
Windows operating system.99 This tie would only be noticed by a
consumer that attempted to get on the internet or tried to get
another browser.100 Additionally, in Jefferson Parrish, a tying
claim was found because a hospital allowed only limited choices of
anesthesiologists.101 However, to discover these limited choices a
patient would need their services. “In both cases, the courts
recognized that the tie existed before deciding whether the tie was
illegal.”102 Therefore, a court may find that a tying arrangement
between iTunes and the iPod exists before initiating an analysis of
the legality of such an arrangement.
1. Two Distinct Products
iTunes and the iPod are two distinct products with different
competitors that are founded in a consumer’s desire for music.
iTunes is an online music store whose competitors include “MSN
Music, Napster (revamped since the lawsuits), MusicNow,
MusicMatch, Wal-Mart, f.y.e., PureTracks and audible.com.”103
“Each competitor has its own subscription agreement and pricing
strategy.”104 Prices for an individual song are generally $0.99,
which means that competitors must adopt alternate strategies to
attract customers. The iPod is a portable music device that
competes with other consumer product manufacturers such as
“Sony, Philips, Creative, iRiver, Archos, Pogo, Interactive Media,

97
See iPod + iTunes, Apple, http://www.apple.com/itunes (iTunes is a program that
may be downloaded separately from any Apple purchase).
98
See, e.g., Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. 2; United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
99
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 88–89.
100
Hsu, supra note 7, at 125.
101
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 30–31.
102
Hsu, supra note 7, at 125.
103
Id.
104
Id.
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and Samsung.”105 The portable music players provided by these
manufacturers must compete based on “capacity, size, battery life,
looks, and compatibility with several music formats.”106 The iPod
has been said to be one of the “worst in battery life, the most
expensive and the least compatible with other music formats.”107
The Supreme Court has ruled that for two products to be
considered distinct there must be sufficient consumer demand so
that it is efficient for a firm to provide each separately.108 “The
presence of different competitors in the iTunes market and the iPod
market strongly infers that Apple has two distinct products because
each market must have their own strategies based on price and
product development.”109 Furthermore, a subscriber of iTunes
does not need an iPod to listen to the music. However, once a
portable music player is desired, that iTunes subscriber must
purchase an iPod. Thus, the purchase of the iPod occurs because
of the AAC-secured format rather than a desire for the product
enhancement of iTunes.110 The iTunes subscription is the tying
product because the AAC-encoded music it provides prevents the
consumer from freely choosing other portable music players. The
iPod is the tied product since a consumer that is not an iTunes
subscriber is free to purchase any available online music player.
Without the existence of the AAC-secured format, iTunes and the
iPod could be sold and marketed independently.
2. Sufficient Economic Power
“Market power is the power ‘to force a purchaser to do
something that he would not do in a competitive market.’”111 “It
has been defined as ‘the ability of a single seller to raise price and

105

Id.
Id.
107
Id. (citing Elliot Van Buskirk, Five reasons not to buy an iPod, CNET REVIEWS,
Nov. 5, 2003, http://reviews.cnet.com/4520-6450_7-5102324-1.html (last visited Oct. 18,
2007)).
108
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 642 (1992).(citing
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21–22).
109
Hsu, supra note 7, at 126.
110
Id.
111
Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 464 (quoting Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14).
106
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restrict output.’”112 “The existence of such power ordinarily is
inferred from the seller’s possession of a predominant share of the
market.”113
A glance at the online music industry reveals the market
dominance enjoyed by Apple. iTunes has more than seventy
percent of the market for downloaded music,114 and Apple’s iPod
players and iTunes Store are said to “have defined the online music
market.”115 Additionally, Apple’s iPod accounts for approximately
seventy-eight percent of all sales of portable music players.116
In Eastman Kodak, the plaintiffs argued that “Kodak’s control
over the parts market . . . excluded service competition, boosted
service prices and forced unwilling consumption of Kodak
service.”117
Evidence of increased prices and excluded
competition imply the existence of market power.118 Claims of the
iPod’s inferiority to other portable music players119 and Apple’s
obstruction to competition with the iPod through the use of AAC
encoded music similarly imply market power (leading to unwilling
consumption).
Furthermore, the presence of other competitors does not
preclude a finding of market dominance. In Eastman Kodak,
Kodak argued for the adoption of a legal rule that would proclaim
that “equipment competition precludes any finding of monopoly
power in derivative aftermarkets.”120 However, the Supreme Court
ruled that it prefers to resolve antitrust claims on a case-by-case
basis with a focus on the particular facts on record:121 “In
determining the existence of market power, and specifically the

112

Id. (quoting Fortner Enter. v. U.S. Steel, 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969)).
Id. (quoting Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 17).
114
See EMI Dropping Copy Limits, supra note 2.
115
Apple Chief, supra note 1.
116
Christopher Sprigman, The 99 Cent Question, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 87,
111 n.31. (2006) (citing MacNN, Apple’s Music Biz, iPod Shares Grow (Apr. 20, 2006),
available at http://www.macnn.com/articles/06/04/20/apples.music.business (last visited
Apr. 13, 2007)).
117
Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 465.
118
See id. at 469.
119
See Hsu, supra note 7, at 126.
120
Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 466 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 33).
121
Id. at 467.
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responsiveness of the sales of one product to price changes of the
other [the Supreme Court] has examined closely the economic
reality of the market at issue.”122 The Supreme Court went on to
rule that “[t]he fact that the equipment market imposes a restraint
on prices in the aftermarkets by no means disproves the existence
of power in those markets.”123 Similarly, in the case of the tie
between iTunes and the iPod, the tie inhibits competition in iPod
pricing because of the lack of substitutes in the iTunes aftermarket.
Additionally, Kodak argued that “supracompetitive prices in
the service market lead to ruinous losses in equipment
sales . . . .”124 One of the counter-arguments that the Court used to
undermine this theory was that the costliness of switching products
would induce consumers to tolerate some level of price increase.125
A comparable argument can be made in the case of Apple since
once an investor has invested the time, money and resources in
obtaining an iTunes subscription, he/she will be willing to tolerate
higher prices for iPods as a result of the increasing cost of
switching online music providers.
3. Not Insubstantial Amount of Interstate Commerce
The “non insubstantial” language was chosen by the Supreme
Court because the Court did not want de minimis damage amounts
to be alleged. But the Court also did not require a substantial
“volume of commerce” to “determine[e] whether the amount of
commerce foreclosed is too insubstantial to warrant prohibition of
the practice.”126 Rather, the Court held that “the relevant figure is
the total volume of sales tied by the sales policy under
challenge . . . .”127
The iPod costs between $79 and $349,128 and over 100 million
have been sold.129 If Apple artificially increased the price per iPod

122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
Id. at 471.
Id. at 476.
See id.
Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1969).
Id. at 502.
iPod + iTunes, Apple, http://www.apple.com/itunes/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
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by five percent then Apple’s tying practices would result in a
multi-million dollar gain. Thus, the amount of commerce involved
is clearly not insubstantial. Furthermore, since iTunes and the iPod
are both available over the Internet and can be accessed/purchased
from any state, the interstate commerce requirement is easily met.
C. Antitrust Violations: “Per Se” Rule and Rule of Reason
Analysis
After a tying arrangement is established, it is necessary to
explore whether the tie violates the Sherman Act or any other
antitrust laws. Although traditionally tying arrangements have
been considered “per se” violations,130 there have been recent
movements towards a rule of reason analysis.131 Thus, the strength
of the iTunes/iPod tying arrangement should be evaluated under
both rules.
1. “Per Se” Rule
The tying arrangement is a “per se” violation because it leaves
consumers privy to inefficient pricing in the iPod market.132
Apple’s offense begins when it encourages the purchase of music
through iTunes but restricts how it can be played and the options of
portable music devices available to consumers, allowing Apple to
charge higher prices for iPods.133
iTunes draws customers with a music collection that has the
greatest market dominance134 and is larger than any other music
download service.135 Once the consumer makes a purchase, he/she
is subject to the terms of the iTunes user agreement and becomes
the owner of AAC-encoded music files. These two features limit

129
Apple Press Release, 100 Million Ipods Sold, http://www.apple.com/pr/library/
2007/04/09ipod.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
130
See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Int’l Salt Co. v. U.S., 332
U.S. 392 (1947).
131
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 94–95 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
132
See, e.g., Hsu, supra note 7, at 128.
133
E.g., id. at 128–32.
134
See EMI Dropping Copy Limits, supra note 2.
135
Sprigman, supra note 116, at 94 (displaying a comparison chart of the available
content, pricing, and terms of service for the ten largest paid music download services).
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where the music can be played (five approved devices) and what
kind of device it can be played on (in the case of portable music
players, the iPod).136
When entering the online music market, Apple was faced with
the challenge of satisfying two opposing laws: the approval of time
shifting in the Sony137 case and the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (“DMCA”).138 “In Sony, the Court allowed the copying of TV
shows to Betamax tapes because the shows were originally free to
watch and no real loss was incurred by the copyright owners.”139
Meanwhile, the DMCA bans the circumvention of electronic
access controls for copyrighted materials. Consumers, of course,
will want to “space-shift” their music onto other devices. In other
words, consumers want the freedom and flexibility of listening to
their music on various devices. However, “[d]efendants in DMCA
violation suits have consistently lost when copyrighted music has
been shifted to another medium.”140
Thus, Apple allows
consumers to “space-shift” music to alternate devices but limits the
number of times a consumer can do so in order to create a
contractual allowance to the DMCA.141
Each time a consumer wants to space-shift a music collection,
the new device must be registered to the Apple iTunes server.142
The registration requirement is essentially an enforcement
technique that ensures that the consumer complied with limits on
space-shifting. iPods are excepted from this general rule because
iPods do not need to be registered. Although the terms of the user
agreement provide that a consumer will not share music on more
than five devices, there is no technological enforcement in the case
of the iPod.143 The special treatment given to iPods makes it
possible for an iTunes customer to share his/her songs with an
136

Hsu, supra note 7, at 128–29.
Sony Corp., of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984).
138
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1999)
139
Hsu, supra note 7, at 129 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 (1984)).
140
Id. at 129, n.84 (summarizing case law from the 9th Cir. and S.D.N.Y. holding file
sharing in violation of the DMCA).
141
Id. at 129.
142
Id. (citing iTunes 4: About Music Store Authorization and Deauthorization,
http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=93014 (last visited Mar. 10, 2005)).
143
See Hsu, supra note 7, at 129–30, n.87.
137
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unlimited number of iPods. Even though the consumer may share
songs infinitely, artists are only compensated once, and, thus, a
copyright infringement is born.
a) Comparison with Kodak
In the Kodak case, Kodak implemented policies that limited the
availability of replacement parts to independent service
organizations (ISOs), making it more difficult for them to compete
with Kodak in servicing Kodak machines.144 The ISOs brought an
antitrust action against Kodak for unlawfully tying the sale of
service for Kodak machines to the sale of parts (a § 1 Sherman Act
violation) and unlawfully monopolizing and attempting to
monopolize, the sale of service for Kodak machines (a § 2
Sherman Act violation).145
The Supreme Court ruled that “service and parts are separate
markets” and that Kodak has the “‘power to control prices or
exclude competition’ in service and parts.”146 Thus, Kodak created
an illegal tie between services and parts in violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act. A Sherman Act § 2 violation requires a showing of
“a scheme of willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly
power.”147 The Court held that “Kodak took exclusionary action to
maintain its parts monopoly and used its control over parts to
strengthen its monopoly share of the Kodak service market.”148
Similarly, in the case of the iTunes/iPod tying arrangement,
there is a substantial argument to be made that the measure taken
by Apple in the form of barring the purchase of other portable
music players by iTunes subscribers through the use of the AAC
code format also reflects a willful scheme to acquire/maintain
monopoly power. No one can compete with the iPod among
iTunes subscribers because of the incompatibility between the
AAC encoded music and other portable music players. The
exclusion of all other portable music players mandates the
purchase of an iPod if a consumer wants to listen to music on a
144
145
146
147
148

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 458 (1992).
Id. at 459.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 483.
Id.
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portable music player. This requirement is analogous to the tying
arrangement in Kodak “where a consumer would not purchase
competing service contracts after buying the Kodak bundled parts
and service contract because of the extra costs incurred to buy a
useless service contract. . . . [A]n iTunes consumer will not
purchase a non-iPod because the purchase will be useless to the
consumer.”149 As a result of the tying arrangement, Apple can
“leverage the iTunes monopoly to create a greater market share for
the iPod.”150 Thus, Apple should be subject to liability under the
Sherman Act.
2. Rule of Reason
a) Economic Benefits
The rule of reason test paves way for courts to consider
economic benefits as well as the adverse economic effects of the
tying arrangement in comparison to the emphasis of the “per se”
rules on the anti-competitive result. In Microsoft, the defendants
argued that the tying arrangement/integration is beneficial to
consumers because choices are not reduced and consumers gain
from the integration of added functionality into platform
software:151 “Since consumers could still choose other browsers
and the Windows OS was enhanced by the Internet Explorer
integration, the court remanded the case for deeper analysis of the
competitive loss borne by the consumers compared to the benefit
gained by integration.”152
Apple has many arguments that can support the existence of
economic benefits to the consumer that stem from the iTunes/iPod
tying arrangements. First of all, it presents a solution to the
copyright infringement problem of illegal downloading that
plagues the online music industry. Through the AAC code format,
iTunes limits the space-shifting of music to five devices.
Additionally, “[u]nlimited iPod transfers do not disrupt the AAC

149
150
151
152

Hsu, supra note 7, at 131.
Id.
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 94–95 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Hsu, supra note 7, at 133 (citing Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 94–95).
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encoded security measures.”153 When music is transferred to an
iPod it is encoded with the AAC format, and to transfer it back
onto another device that device must be registered: “Thus the iPod
is harmonized with iTunes’ security measures because a consumer
gets to download music to a portable player and copyright
infringement is stopped at the iPod.”154 A scheme of “legitimate
sharing of music” is created.155
Secondly, Apple can argue that consumers benefit from the
AAC code format because it ensures that artists receive royalties
and therefore have an incentive to continue creating and producing
music.156 On the flip side, the consumers have accepted this form
of copyright law compliance. Given the popularity of iTunes and
the iPod it can be argued that the tying arrangement has produced a
solution that is legally compliant and makes the consumers happy.
Lastly, there are other options that exist for consumers.
Consumers can, for example, burn the AAC encoded music onto
CDs and play it on CD players.157 Also, if the prices for the iTunes
service were truly non-competitive consumers have other
competitors from whom they can opt to purchase music and
portable music players.158
Apple can approach the tying arrangement claim from a
different angle by arguing for a broader definition of the market to
refute the notion that it has sufficient market power (the second
element of a tying arrangement claim). Digital music accounts for
only about ten percent of the music industry as a whole, or about
$2 billion of the industry’s sales in 2006.159 The iTunes store has
an even smaller share of that. Thus, in the context of the music
industry, Apple barely has the power to induce customers to
purchase iPods.

153
154
155
156
157
158
159

Hsu, supra note 7, at 133.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 134.
See id.
See EMI Dropping Copy Limits, supra note 2.
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b) Justification
The rule of reason requires pro-competitive justifications for
anticompetitive behavior.160 When the iPod was first released it
could not play music that was not encoded with the AAC code
format well.161 The continuation of this practice would violate the
rule of reason because there is no benefit from limiting the
consumer from playing music without the AAC code format; “[it
took] away the usefulness of non-AAC music without giving
anything back to society.”162 Thus, Apple made the iPod
compatible with most other codec formats. However, the iPod is
still incompatible with the Microsoft Windows Music Audio
Codec (“WMA”) which is the standard used on Microsoft’s
Windows Media Player, the default media player on the Windows
operating system.163 Apple goes so far as to encourage the
conversion of WMA files into AAC files knowing that once the
conversion is complete only the iPod can play the AAC files. By
forgoing a competitor’s standards to use the iPod, the iTunes/iPod
tying arrangement is reinforced to the benefit of Apple and to no
benefit to the consumer (besides the labor of conversion).164
It is argued that if Apple fixed the incompatibility issue or
allowed other portable music players to play AAC encoded music,
then the iTunes/iPod tying arrangement would be legal under a rule
of reason test.165 The reasoning is as follows: “iTunes customers
would no longer be forced to buy the iPod” and the “consumer
would gain the benefits of having an integrated product without the
restriction on their choice of portable music players.”166
VI. INTERNATIONAL BACKLASH TO APPLE’S SOLUTION
Consumer organizations in several European countries have
expressed discontent over the fact that the AAC encoded files
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
See Hsu, supra note 7, at 134.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 134–35.
See id. at 135.
Id.
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purchased on iTunes can only be played on iPods.167 In January
2007, a Consumer Ombudsman in Norway agreed with a
complaint filed on the matter on behalf of the Norwegian
Consumer Council. Apple’s response was due by March 1, 2007,
and it has until October 1, 2007, to remedy the situation: “The
Ombudsman has also backed the Consumer Council’s claim that
the DRM technology is not simply a copy protection scheme. The
Council had argued that in restricting consumers’ use of music so
heavily the technology broke contract law in Norway.”168
Admittedly, Norway is a small market, but more significantly,
Norway’s complaint has been echoed in other European countries,
including France, Germany and the Netherlands.169 According to
Mark Mulligan, an analyst at Jupiter Research, “Apple can see that
the legislative tide is turning in Europe. . . . To U.S. readers it
might seem strange to be so concerned about consumer group
actions in little markets like Norway, which have just four million
inhabitants. But this is all about precedents and other markets
following suit.”170 Thus, Apple’s iPod/iTunes tying arrangement
has already begun to cause some international legal problems and,
if the tie continues, promises to create more in the future.
CONCLUSION
When EMI announced that it would offer DRM-free music,
and that the music would be available on iTunes, a Wall Street
Journal reporter said “a major label is finally treating its customers
like customers, instead of regarding them as likely shoplifters who
should be given as few rights as possible.”171 While there may be
some truth to that statement, this paper presents alternate reasons
that probably influenced EMI’s decision. These alternatives
167

See Eric Pfanner, Europe Cool to Apple’s Suggestions on Music, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/08/technology/08music.html.
168
Apple DRM Illegal in Norway: Ombudsman, REGISTER, Jan. 24, 2007, available at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/24/apple_drm_illegal_in_norway.
169
See Pfanner, supra note 167.
170
Id.
171
Jason Fry, A Changing Map for Digital Music, WALL ST. J. Apr. 9, 2007, available
at http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB117579460306061099-pDg6mCZljJVPz_Udzot
m9C2hOcA_20070509.html.
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encompass different approaches to making music available to
consumers online and the problems faced by each of them. Given
the failure of free P2P networks, the difficulties faced by DRM,
and antitrust issues regarding Apple’s iTunes/iPod, it is not
surprising that a new development has been made in the music
industry in the sale of online files. Furthermore, a move towards
DRM-free online music would help lift Apple out of the legal
trouble it faces regarding the iTunes/iPod link in some countries,
and the potential legal claims it could face in others (including an
antitrust claim under United States law as explored above). It can
be argued that the mounting legal, both copyright and antitrust,
problems faced by the music industry forced the powerful players
in the industry, such as EMI and Apple, to consider new,
innovative solutions. Hopefully, after years of exploration in
varying approaches and constant uncertainty, a viable solution that
successfully balances the competing interests of various parties has
emerged.

